Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased substantially in recent years.
Introduction
Is Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) primarily drawn to poorly governed countries with abundant natural resources? In recent years, the Chinese financial presence globally has increased substantially, in terms of loans provided, investments made, and other types of flows. In particular, there has been a marked rise in outward Chinese foreign direct investment in recent years. This has spurred discussion and analyses of the motivation and implications of an increased Chinese presence, not least in developing economies. On the one hand, increased Chinese investment may be good for host countries, since more companies vie for locations and markets, and potentially expand opportunities for transfer of technology.
On the other hand, however, concerns have been voiced that Chinese investment or financial flows more generally have contributed to propping up bad regimes in host countries, and been conducted with a view to exploiting their natural resources. To borrow a headline from The Economist, is China simply "a ravenous dragon" or is there more to Chinese investment than this? 1 Though Chinese outward FDI has generated considerable interest, concern and controversy, few empirical studies have been conducted to test the motives behind or consequences of the presence of Chinese multinationals in other countries. There is by now a large econometric literature on the host country determinants of FDI in general, which, if anything, suggests that FDI is attracted to countries with good institutions (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002) . Since FDI in general is dominated by flows from developed countries, it is an open question whether these results generalize to Chinese outward FDI. Moreover, there is an emerging literature on FDI flows from emerging economies, which suggests that these flows may differ from those of developed economies (Filatotchev et al, 2007) . Most studies of FDI related to China, have focused on China as a location for FDI from other countries, rather than as a source of FDI.
To date there are only three econometric studies of the determinants of Chinese outward FDI that we are aware of, which present mixed results. Buckley et al (2007) find that Chinese FDI is attracted to countries with bad institutions (high political risk), whereas Cheung and Qian (2008) find no significant effect of institutions. The latter study finds Chinese FDI to be attracted by natural resources, the former gets this result only for later time periods. A third 1 The Economist, March 15th 2008, Special report p. 3. study by Cheng and Ma (2008) does not include institutions nor resources as explanatory variables.
This paper presents new econometric results on the host country determinants of Chinese outward FDI, which significantly improve on previous studies. A main problem with the studies of Buckley et al (2007) and Cheung and Qian (2008) is that their data on FDI captures approved investment, rather than actual investment. 2 The results are therefore potentially biased, as investment that is publicly approved may be of a character different from investment decisions that are less visible. For instance, non-approved flows may reflect private investment decisions based on different objectives than government approved flows, or public investment decisions reflecting motives a government may be reluctant to reveal, such as a drive for natural resources, or the exploitation of host countries with poor institutions. This paper uses more recent data on actual Chinese FDI flows, and therefore provides more reliable results on the impact of host country institutions and resources on Chinese investment. Moreover, previous studies have looked at institutions and natural resources in isolation, and not explored whether the two have a joint influence on Chinese FDI. By contrast, this study tests and finds of significant importance an interacted effect of institutions and resources, suggesting that Chinese investment is more attracted to a country with natural resources, the worse the institutional environment of that country.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a descriptive overview of Chinese FDI flows, and relates this to the existing empirical literature on the topic. Since there are suggestions that Chinese FDI reflects different motives than FDI generally, section 3 reviews theoretical arguments as to why this may be the case, leading to a set of testable hypotheses relating to the impact of natural resources and institutions. Section 4 then presents the empirical strategy and the data of the paper. Results on the impact of institutions and natural resources on Chinese FDI are presented and discussed in section 5, which also contains a number of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
2 Approved investment numbers also did not include reinvested earnings, leading to serious underestimates of Chinese FDI (Cheng and Ma, 2008) . Cai (1999) suggests that only 15-20% of actual financial outflows in the period up to the late 1990s were approved.
Chinese outward FDI: Patterns and evidence

Descriptive overview of Chinese outward FDI
Outward foreign direct investment from China has increased considerably in recent years, and
China is the source of FDI in a great number of host economies. While the open door policy in the late 1970s lead to modest outward FDI, the liberalization associated with Deng
Xiaping's tour of South China in 1992, and the Go Global strategy initiated in 1999, lead to boosts in Chinese outward FDI, and outward FDI in recent years has increased substantially (Cai, 1999; Hong and Sun, 2006; Ma, 2008, Buckley et al, 2007 However, a number of other countries receive substantial amounts in absolute terms, this includes both OECD and non-OECD countries. As for sectoral composition, just over 40% of Chinese outward FDI flows in 2006 were in the mining and petroleum sector, whereas almost 54% was in various service industries (mainly business services and finance), and only 4% in manufacturing (Cheng and Ma, 2008 China in Hong Kong and tax havens reflect a phenomenon of "round-tripping", whereby funds are moved abroad to take advantage of beneficial host country conditions, and then reinvested in China to benefit from advantageous terms for foreign investors (Morck et al., 2008; Yeung and Lie, 2008; Cheng and Ma, 2008; Cheng and Stough, 2007) . Alternatively, these flows may represent the establishment of holding companies for investment elsewhere, or attempts to conceal wealth from tax authorities or other parties (Morck et al., 2008) . Due to the inherent secrecy of these locations, the nature and ultimate destinations of FDI flows are difficult to reveal (Morck et al., 2008; Cheng and Ma, 2008) . For this reason, since these flows likely reflect motives different from other FDI flows, and since data on key explanatory variables is not available for these locations, we exclude them in the subsequent analysis.
Evidence on Chinese outward FDI
Some systematic empirical evidence on host country determinants of Chinese FDI does exist.
Given the increasing financial presence of China abroad, a number of studies have been published in recent years on Chinese FDI. Most of these present simple descriptive data on Chinese investment and/or theoretical arguments, some of which we will return to in the following section. As noted, however, three econometric studies have to date been performed on data on Chinese FDI flows. While these studies suggest a number of relevant variables to include in our analysis, their results are mixed, and they also have flaws in the data used and their specifications, which need to be addressed. Buckley et al (2007) 
Is China different? Theoretical arguments.
The above studies suggest that Chinese investors may respond differently to host country factors than other investors, at least with respect to institutions. Theoretical studies argue that good host country institutions will reduce risk and costs of doing business and increase productivity (Blonigen, 2005) , and hence attract FDI. Most recent empirical studies of total FDI flows also document a positive relationship to host country institutions (Asiedu, 2006; Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Wei, 2000; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Gani, 2007) . While Bénassy-Quéré et al (2007) argues that these studies do not control for endogeneity, we are not aware of any study suggesting that weak institutions increase total FDI inflows. While natural resources are one locational advantage in the OLI framework of Dunning (1977 Dunning ( , 1993 , their impact on total FDI has not been much examined empirically. Harms and
Ursprung (2002) (Yeung and Liu, 2008) . Of the thirty largest companies by outward FDI, all but two are state controlled, and though most are listed on a stock exchange, the state retains majority power and appoints executives, largely from party ranks (Morck et al, 2008) . This means that their investment decisions reflect political objectives, and not just profit-maximization as in the case of privately owned multinationals from other countries. 6 In principle, such objectives may be to promote domestic development (Deng, 2004) , ensure regime survival or increase the wealth or status of those in power (Morck et al, 2008) , to support Chinese foreign policy, or promote host country development (Yeung and Liu, 2008) . The latter objective would entail more Chinese FDI to poorer countries, which our empirical analysis does not confirm, and is hence unlikely to be of importance. Though some studies claim that Chinese FDI is becoming more commercial (Cheng and Stough, 2008; Hong and Sun, 2006) , political objectives likely remain relatively more important than for multinationals from other countries. Even FDI by privately owned Chinese firms may to some extent reflect political objectives, due to the incentives they face when investing abroad (cf. Cheng and Ma, 2008) .
Secondly, in addition to reflecting different objectives, Chinese FDI may also reflect different opportunities or incentives than FDI from other countries. In particular, China has a quite different institutional environment than the major source countries of FDI from the developed world. The level of corruption in China is much higher than in the major industrialized source countries of FDI. Moreover, for those companies listed, China has much weaker stock market regulations than other countries, and only 15% of Chinese overseas listing is in the United
States (Hung et al., 2008) . A number of studies argue that home country institutions affect their competitive advantages (Belloc, 2006; Levchenko, 2007 , Costinot, 2009 ). In terms of FDI, some studies suggest that investment patterns do not just reflect better or worse institutions, but also similarities in institutions between home and host country. For instance, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) find that greater absolute differences in corruption have a negative impact on bilateral FDI. The institutional setting in China may thus be an important determinant of the sectors and countries it invests in. Accordingly, a number of studies of Chinese FDI suggest that Chinese companies have competitive advantages in countries with weak institutions. In contrast to companies from developed economies, Chinese companies are experienced in "navigating complex patronclient relationships and personal and institutional favours in relatively opaque and difficult business environments" and in "dealing with burdensome regulations and navigating around .. opaque political constraints" (Yeung and Liu, 2008:71; Morck et al 2008:346) . In this respect, Chinese firms face a lesser "liability of foreignness" than its Western counterparts (He and Lyles, 2008; Child and Rodrigues, 2005) . Moreover, less stringent regulation of Chinese firms makes ethically questionable activities such as corruption less risky and financially costly, and perhaps also less costly morally in a country where such activities are more common. In addition, extensive personal or ethnic networks may serve as a substitute for formal institutions (cf. Tong, 2005; Shafer 2007; Park and Luo 2001; Kiong and Kee, 1998) . All these arguments converge on a hypothesis that Chinese FDI may be attracted to (specialize in) countries with poor institutions.
The fact that Chinese multinationals are predominantly state-owned, whose activities reflect political objectives, augments and adds nuance to this hypothesis. Several studies argue that the organization of these companies, the focus on political expediency of investments, and the economic and political backing of the government, have lead to excessive risk taking and unprofitable investments (Yeung and Liu, 2008; Morck et al., 2008; Buckley et al., 2007) . As one main effect of institutions is to reduce risk (Blonigen, 2005) , this again suggests that Chinese investment may be attracted to countries with poor institutions. This leads to the first hypothesis to be tested in our empirical analysis:
Hypothesis 1: Chinese FDI is attracted by countries with poor institutions
The variety of political objectives that Chinese FDI may reflect do, however, also entail the need to make some important distinctions between different types of host country institutions.
The previous arguments all suggest that Chinese FDI may flows to countries with weak private sector institutions, i.e. institutions governing the profitability of productive enterprise, such as the rule of law. It has, however, been suggested that that China may direct FDI to undemocratic countries for ideological or strategic reasons (Buckley et al., 2007 As for natural resources, a number of studies suggest that China invests in resource rich countries to obtain greater security of access to energy and other resources (Cheng and Ma, 2008; Morck et al. 2008; Hong and Sun, 2006; Deng, 2004 (Wiig and Kolstad, 2009 ).
Given the large and appropriable rents in natural resource rich countries, it is reasonable to argue that the returns to any competitive advantage China has in operating in countries with poor institutions, are greater where these kinds of resources are present. Or to be blunt, companies with a competitive advantage in bribery, are likely to invest more in countries where the payoffs from bribes are greater, which is arguably the case in resource rich countries. Distributive effects of institutions are more likely to outweigh risk and cost effects in resource rich countries, producing greater gains to those investors able and willing to manoeuvre a challenging institutional settings. These arguments relate to both commercial and political returns, if secure access to natural resources is important politically, this can be achieved more efficiently in countries where Chinese companies have a competitive advantage.
In sum, this means that one would expect institutions to have more of a negative effect on Chinese FDI, the more natural resources a host country has. Or conversely, natural resources attract Chinese FDI more, the worse the institutions of a host country. This can be tested by including an interaction effect between institutions and natural resources, which would be negative if the above arguments hold. Thus, our third hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3: Chinese FDI is negatively related to the interaction of natural resources and institutions.
Our empirical specification will thus include variables that simultaneously test the effect of institutions and resources, and their interaction. If support is found for hypothesis 3, one way to interpret this is that Chinese investment abroad is made to exploit countries with large natural resources and poor institutions, confer the above discussion on the distribution of resource rents. Other interpretations are also possible, for instance that for China as a latecomer in FDI, the only opportunities for investment in natural resources are in poorly governed countries, and we attempt to empirically distinguish these two interpretations.
Data and methodology
Consistent with the theory and hypotheses formulated above, our empirical specification includes institutions and natural resources as well as their interaction as explanatory variables.
More precisely, the main estimated equation is: comprehensively than earlier data used in previous studies such as Buckley et al (2007) and Cheung and Qian (2008) , which only captured approved flows. The data for our dependent variable is in millions of constant 2000 USD. The main institutional variable in our analysis is the Rule of Law index from the World Bank Since some theoretical arguments point to private sector institutions, and others to democracy as determinants of Chinese FDI, we also use indices of democracy to test the relative importance of these arguments. The main proxy for democracy used for this purpose is the Polity IV democracy index. However, we also perform similar tests using indices from Freedom House and the WBI voice and accountability index.
As our proxy for natural resources, we use the share of fuels plus ores and metals exports in GDP. By using exports shares of a set of primary products, we thus follow the seminal study of Sachs and Warner (1995) on the impact of resources on growth, and a number of subsequent studies of the economic consequences of natural resources. As noted, the previous studies of Chinese FDI have used different indices of natural resources and got different results. We test for the importance of various resources by also disaggregating our natural resource index into fuels and ores/metals exports, respectively. Some recent work has suggested that instead of export shares, studies of natural resources should use indices of resource endowments, i.e. how much is in the ground (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Lederman and Maloney, 2008) . However, consistent with the arguments of Kolstad and Wiig (2008) , what would be attractive to investors are natural resource rents rather than what is in the ground, which makes export shares a better proxy than resource endowments.
As reflected by the above specification, we interact the institutional and natural resource variable for our main estimation. A concern that naturally arises in included interacted variables, is that they will be highly correlated with the individual variables from which they arise, and hence cause multicollinearity problems. This turns out not to be a problem for our main estimations, however. The interaction term is not too highly correlated with the two individual variables from which it is computed (see correlation matrix in table 4). We add a number of control variables that have been found to be of importance in previous studies of host country determinants of global FDI flows (see Chakrabarti (2001) or Blonigen (2005) for reviews). The main control variables are GDP, trade, inflation, and distance between the host economy and China. GDP is found to be robustly associated with FDI in a number of studies, and is commonly argued to reflect market size in host economies and hence market-seeking motives of investors. Trade, measured as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, is similarly found to be a robust determinant of FDI across a number of studies. Inflation is commonly used as a measure of macroeconomic stability in host countries, though results on this variable are more mixed. Since the costs of investing in more distant location is greater, we also include the geographical distance from the capital of the host country to Beijing, as an explanatory variable, in line with gravity models of FDI.
The expectation is for the coefficients of GDP and trade to be positive and for inflation and distance to be negative. We also test the robustness of our main results by adding a number of additional control variables, such as exchange rates, interest rates, total FDI, economic growth, GDP per capita, educational levels and infrastructure, all from the World Bank World Development Indicators. We also add region dummies. A number of the above variables were used in previous studies of Chinese FDI. In addition, we include a number of variables found significant in these studies, which includes cultural proximity to China (common language), a dummy for common border with China, and a dummy for landlocked countries. None of these variables turned out to be significant, and so are not included in the main specification.
Since there is data for our dependent variable only for four years, there is too little variation over time in the variables included in the analysis to reasonably employ panel estimation techniques. We therefore perform OLS estimations using the average of Chinese outward FDI to the host countries for the period 2003-2006 as our dependent variable. This is also consistent with other studies of FDI flows, which smooth FDI flows by using period averages.
To address endogeneity or reverse causality problems, we lag the explanatory variables, using their average for the period 2000-2002. The next section presents the results of our estimations. In the first regression, the interaction effect between institutions and natural resources is not included. The results show that the only variable to be significantly associated with Chinese outward FDI is host country GDP. In other words, Chinese outward FDI is attracted to countries with large markets. None of the other explanatory variables are significant. In particular, this estimation finds no effect of host country natural resources or institutional level on the inflow of Chinese FDI.
Results
The second regression shows, however, that excluding the interaction between resources and institutions, is too restrictive an empirical model. When adding the interaction between institutions and natural resources, we get a significant and negative coefficient for this term, while results otherwise are qualitatively unchanged. In other words, rejecting the influence of institutions and natural resources on Chinese investments based on the first regression would be premature. In fact, what the significance of the interaction effect tells us is that the effect of natural resources on Chinese outward FDI depends on the institutions of the host country.
Recall that the institutional index runs from -2.5 to 2.5. For countries with bad institutions The results also seem to be related to a particular type of resource. Replacing the broad natural resource index with narrower indices of fuel exports in GDP or ores and metals exports in GDP, our results shows that the interacted term is significant only for fuel exports.
This suggests that petroleum is the resource of primary interest for Chinese FDI. The coefficient of the individual fuels term is not significant, however, so again this variable is only significant when interacted with institutions.
A range of robustness tests, shows this result to be a resilient one. A significant and negative interaction effect remains even if additional control variables are added, such as exchange rates, interest rates, total FDI, economic growth, GDP per capita, educational levels and infrastructure (mobile phones). 8 Moreover, the result is robust to the inclusion of other institutional variables, such as all other WBI governance variables, the average of Freedom
House political rights and civil liberties index and their freedom of press index, and the Polity IV democracy index. 9 And we get the same result if we add region dummies, an index of cultural proximity to China, a dummy for common border with China, and a dummy for landlocked countries. None of these other control or institutional variables proved significant.
8 Attempts to use other proxies for infrastructure resulted in multicollinearity problems. 9 Addition of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index resulted in multicollinearity problems.
The results from the full sample thus suggest two main sets of determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment; market size, and natural resources coupled with poor institutions. Splitting the sample into OECD-and non-OECD countries reveals that these sets of determinants are associated with different kinds of host countries. The third column of Table 5 presents results when rerunning the main estimation for OECD countries only, of which there are 25 in our sample. The only significant variable is GDP, which suggests that Chinese FDI into rich countries is driven by market size. The fourth column of the table presents results for non-OECD countries, and shows that GDP is not a significant determinant of Chinese FDI to these countries, but that distance from China deters investment in these countries, which was not a significant variable in the full sample. More interestingly given our focus, natural resources and institutions appear to be determinants of FDI to non-OECD countries mainly. 10 In fact, both the individual natural resource term and the interacted term are significant for non-OECD countries. The positive coefficient of resources suggests that
Chinese FDI is attracted to countries with natural resources. The negative interaction effect
indicates that the degree of that attraction depends on institutions, and that the attraction of resources is greater the worse the institutional environment. The effect of natural resources on Chinese FDI is also economically significant. For a country whose institutional score is -1.5
(which is about the score of Angola), the total coefficient of natural resources is approximately 97, 11 which means that an increase of natural resource exports in GDP of 10 percentage points brings an additional Chinese investment of almost 10 million USD (in constant 2000 dollars).
In sum, we find that Chinese outward FDI is attracted to large markets, and countries with large natural resources and poor institutions. The former is related to advanced markets, whereas the latter is the case for non-OECD countries. Our result for GDP is consistent with that of Buckley et al (2007) , Cheung and Qian (2008) and Cheng and Ma (2008) . However, we do not find an unconditional effect of institutions on Chinese FDI as did Buckley et al, nor are natural resource insignificant as in their study. Instead, our results suggest that the effect of institutions is inherently related to natural resources; the weaker the institutions the more is Chinese outward FDI attracted by natural resources. The differences in results from previous studies may reflect the use of newer and more comprehensive data, or that previous studies have a more restrictive empirical model which did not include interaction effects.
12
Our findings are consistent with the idea that Chinese FDI is conducted to exploit countries with poor institutions and large natural resources. However, as noted earlier, it is also possible that Chinese investment flows to countries with these characteristics, since these represent the only available locations for a latecomer such as China. We attempted to test whether the second interpretation holds, by adding the growth in resource exports as an explanatory variable. If Chinese investment flows to countries that have unexploited resources and hence are still growing in terms of natural resources, this should make the interaction term insignificant. However, the interaction term of institutions and resources remains significant when adding this term. This lends support to the former explanation that China takes advantage of countries with poor institutions and large natural resources.
Our results do also lend support to the idea that determinants of Chinese FDI differs from that of other countries. Rerunning our estimations using total FDI inflows as a dependent variable, 13 there is no significant direct effect of natural resources on FDI, nor is the interaction between natural resources and institutions significant. This also holds for the subsample of non-OECD host countries. In contrast to Chinese FDI, total FDI is attracted to countries with good institutions.
Concluding remarks
The results of this paper show that institutions and natural resources have an interactive effect on Chinese outward foreign direct investment. The worse the institutional environment of a host country, the more is Chinese FDI attracted by the country's natural resources. These results add significantly to our understanding of Chinese FDI, since previous studies have not included these types of interaction effects, and therefore fail to capture an important relation between resource riches and institutions. Our findings are consistent with an image of China as a "ravenous dragon", or an idea that Chinese FDI is conducted to exploit countries with poor institutions and large natural resources.
An important question is what consequences this type of investment behaviour has for host economies, and developing economies in particular. It is striking that Chinese foreign investment appears to be attracted by the type of institutional dysfunctions which are at the core of the so-called resource curse, whereby poor institutions lead to a detrimental impact of natural resources on economic development (Mehlum et al, 2006) . This may be particularly harmful, since Chinese investment would then play straight into key dysfunctions of resource rich developing countries, possibly exacerbating resource-related problems. This further strengthens the tentative conclusion of Frynas and Paolo (2007:251) that "the new investments in the African oil and gas sector may not necessarily be good news for ordinary Africans".
Our results, and comparisons with previous studies, also suggest that Chinese FDI outflows differ from FDI from other regions, in their attraction to poorly governed countries rich in natural resources. These differences in investment patterns likely reflects background characteristics of the Chinese economy, in particular predominant state-ownership of multinational companies, and the institutional context of China. Though aggregate FDI flows from China and from other regions differ, there might still be similarities at the sector level which the aggregate data mask. For instance, it is possible that oil investment from China and from other countries is driven by the same set of factors. At present, data which disaggregates FDI flows both by sector and location is not available for most countries, including China.
But this is an important issue to pursue in further research.
